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By Theodore J. St. Antoine
quarter century ago, I
used the phrase "
reader" to charact
role an arbitrator plays in construing a collective bargaining agreement.1 This phrase has almost
invariably been misunderstood to
refer to reading or interpreting
the contract.
When I spoke of the "contract
reader," it was in the context
judicial review of an
point was this: When a c
before it an arbitrator's
applying a collective ba
agreement, it is as if the e
and the union had -signed
lation stating: "What the
tor says this contract means is
exactly what we me
to say.
That is what we inte
by
agreeing the award would be 'final
and binding.' " In this sense an
"erroneous interpretation" of the
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contract by the arbitrator is a contradiction in terms.
This paper updates this thesis,
emphasizing what may be the hottest
issue in judicial review: When may a
court set aside an arbitral award on the
ground that it violates public policy? It
also addresses the "contract interpretation" aspect of the "contract reader"namely, How should an arbitrator go
about "reading" or interpreting a contract?

In the Steelworkers trilogy the U.S.
Supreme Court made arbitration the
linchpin in the federal scheme for the
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. 2 In Enterprise Wheel,
one of the three cases, the Court
imposed tight constraints on judicial
review of arbitral awards. So long as
the award is not the product of fraud or
corruption, does not exceed the arbitrator's authority under the parties'
submissions, and "draws its essence"
from the labor contract, a court is to
enforce the award without any attempt
to "review the merits." Despite these
strictures, the itch of the judiciary to
right seeming wrongs compelled the
Court to revisit the subject in
Paperworkers v. Misco. 3
Misco presented the public policy

question in dramatic fashion. The 5th
Circuit had refused to enforce an award
reinstating a paper-cutting machine
operator, whose car had been found to
contain marijuana while parked in the
company lot. The Supreme Court
reversed, declaring that "as long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within
the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision." The Court cautioned that "a
court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's
interpretation of [labor] contracts is limited to situations where the contract as
interpreted would violate 'some explicit
public policy' that is 'well defined and
dominant, and is to be ascertained by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.' "

Many lower courts have still not
got the message. Judges have been so
offended by the reinstatement of
deviant postal workers, sexual harassers
and alcoholic airline pilots that they
have disregarded the Supreme Court's
directives in Enterprise Wheel and Misco.
The 1st and 5th Circuits have taken it
upon themselves to find an award at
odds with their notions of public policy, even though the action ordered
would not have violated any positive
law or established public policy had it
been taken by the employer on its own
initiative. 4 The 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th
and D.C. Circuits have been more
faithful to the Misco mandate. 5 The
2nd, 3rd, 8th and 11th Circuits have
vacillated on the issue, but the most
recent decisions seem more in line with
Misco. 6

final and binding dispute resolution
procedure, as it is almost invariably
described in the parties' contracts.
We may shortly have further
enlightenment from the Supreme
Court on this issue. In March 2000 the
Court granted certiorari in Eastern
Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers. 8

This was a case of marijuana ingestion
by a mobile equipment operator. The
lower courts sustained the employee's
reinstatement. They acknowledged
that federal regulations expressed a
"well defined and dominant public policy" against drug use by "those in safety-sensitive positions," but went on to
say: "there is no such policy against the
reinstatement of employees who have
used illegal drugs in the past.'' The 4th
Circuit affirmed without deigning to
publish its opinion.

"
The rejection of otherwise legitimate awards on the basis of a nebulous
public policy usually is based on the
highly subjective feelings of particular
judges. For me, three estimable critics
have correctly assessed the problem
and arrived at the right solution. In
various formulations, Judge Frank
Easterbrook and professors Charles
Craver and David Feller have concluded that if the employer (or the employer in conjunction with the union) has
the lawful authority to take unilaterally
the action directed by the arbitrator,
such as reinstatement of a wrongdoing
employee, the arbitral award should be
upheld against "pubic policy" claims. 7
This simple principle seems so
self-evident, and so implicit in the
Supreme Court's rulings to date, that it
should become the accepted norm in
the future. This approach is entirely in
keeping with the underlying notion
that the arbitrator is the parties' designated spokesperson when it comes to
reading and applying the contract. It
merely confirms that arbitration is a
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The key issue is whether the remedial action ordered by the arbitrator, not
the triggering conduct of the employee,
is contrary to public policy. Of course
the drug-taking employee acted contrary
to public policy. But the award-issuing
arbitrator did not and his or her decision
should stand. That is the way the
Supreme Court should rule in this case.
Is vacating an arbitral award on the
ground that it has "no rational basis"
contrary to the "contract reader" thesis? Regrettably, I cannot say that it is.
In agreeing to a final and binding arbitration procedure, the parties presumably took it for granted that arbitrators
would not be insane and would not
reach decisions that are totally unreasonable. In any event, it is probably
impossible to keep courts from intervening, on one theory or another,
when an award seems utterly irrational.
One can only hope that careful, artful
crafting of arbitral opinions will keep
this judicial exception to the finality
doctrine to the barest minimum.
Continued on page 14
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Arbitrators have a tough job. How
should they go about divining the parties' intent when the reality is the parties never contemplated the particular
issue that has arisen? What should they
do when the "plain meaning" of the
contract conflicts with bargaining history or established practice?
Numerous arbitrators of high
repute have accepted (or at least paid lip
service to) the plain meaning rule and its
benighted first cousin, the parol evidence rule. 9 Carlton Snow and Richard
Mittenthal have said nearly all that
needs to be said about the plain meaning rule and past practice. Snow bluntly
stated: "Arbitrators' continued invocation of the plain meaning rule is anomalous in light of the trend to reject the
rule by the courts, the [Uniform
Commercial Code], the Restatement
[of Contracts], and treatise writers." 10
Mittenthal was prepared to declare
almost 40 years ago that past practice
"may be used to clarify what is ambiguous, to give substance to what is general,
and perhaps even to modify or amend
what is seemingly unambiguous." 11
California Supreme Court Justice
Roger Traynor put his finger on the
problem when he said:
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written instrument to its four-corners
merely because it seems to the
court to be clear and unambiguous,
would either deny the relevance of
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the intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has
not attained. 12
In my view, if fidelity to the parties' intent (or their putative intent
about an unanticipated problem) is the
touchstone of sound
contract interpretation,
the a priori rejection of
any evidence reasonably probative of that
intent cannot be justified. In collective bargaining, what I call
"contextual interpretation" is likely to be
grounded in evidence
concerning negotiating
history and past practice.
Recent decisions
indicate that some arbitrators are prepared to look behind the apparent plain
meaning of the written instrument to
discern intent from bargaining history
and other parol evidence. 13 (Some arbitrators play it safe by finding an ambiguity in the contract language, which
makes their resort to extrinsic evidence
quite conventional.)
Logically there seems no reason
not to consider such evidence. If the
parties decided to cloak certain provisions of their agreement in a private
code for reasons they considered sufficient (for example, to conceal trade
secrets from the employer's competitors), an arbitrator should entertain
evidence to that effect, however clear
and unambiguous the language might
otherwise appear. 14
What about the practical argument
in favor of the plain meaning rulethe time and cost of trying to prove
that what seems clear and unambiguous
is not. Here, as in so many other areas,
the solution has to be the sound discretion of the arbitrator. I would not
reject out of hand an offer to prove that
the apparently clear and unambiguous
was in fact intended to mean something totally different. But I would
refuse proffered evidence that reflected
one party's internal, uncommunicated
understandings of the contract terms,
and I would give short shrift to testimony or exhibits that were vague and
SEPT.-NOV.
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not directly on target. The language
finally chosen by the parties to embody
their agreement is entitled to that
much respect.
Today's major issue concerning
past practice is whether it can modify
or override clear contract language to
the contrary. My sense is that arbitrators will find that a
long-standing and
well-accepted practice
may prevail even over a
clear, express provision
in the agreement. 15
However, there is also
substantial authority
that past practice cannot trump an unambiguous
contract
term. 16
Employers have
responded to the encroachments of past
practice by resorting to various types of
"zipper" clauses designed to make the
final written agreement the exclusive
source of employee rights. Arbitrators
are divided on the efficacy of this
approach.17
The past practice cases are highly
fact-specific. Generalizations are hazardous. But in my view two fundamental principles are apposite. First, any
contract, including a collective bargaining agreement, is subject to amendment by the parties. Absent statutory
or contractual restrictions, the parties
can fashion their contract and amend it
as they choose by deeds just as well as
by words. Second, for a practice to
become sufficiently well-established to
be binding on the parties, it must meet
the following usual criteria: clarity,
consistency, longevity and mutual
acceptability. Mutual acceptability is
especially crucial if the practice is
claimed to have superseded a clear,
express contract provision to the contrary. If all these conditions are met,
the practice should prevail over the
contractual language.

Once a great debate raged within
the National Academy of Arbitrators
over what an arbitrator should do when
confronted with a conflict between the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the requirements of external

law. I still believe that in the rare case
of an irreconcilable clash between contract and law (or dominant public policy), if the parties have not expressly or
impliedly authorized external law to be
taken into account, the arbitrator
should follow the contract and ignore
the law. 18
The civil rights statutes provide
vital protections against discrimination
in employment on the grounds of race,
sex, religion, age, disability and the
like. An arbitral award in a case where
statutory rights are implicated is, of
course, not entitled to the same final
and binding effect that is customary in
pure contract arbitrations. 19 But under
footnote 21 in Alexander v. GardnerDenver, an arbitration decision in a discrimination case may be admitted in
subsequent court proceedings and
accorded "great weight" if certain conditions are met. These conditions
include contractual provisions that

"conform substantially with [the
applicable statute]," "procedural fairness," "adequacy of the record," and
the "special competence of particular
arbitrators." 20
Advocates and arbitrators alike
have a professional responsibility to
ensure compliance with these Supreme
Court standards in discrimination
cases. Except for procedural fairness,
which arbitrators presumably always
bear in mind, the Gardner-Denver factors require deliberate attention.
Even if an antidiscrimination provision in a collective bargaining contract closely tracks a particular civil
rights statute, the judicial gloss on the
legislation should be considered.
Advocates should educate the arbitrator
on these nuances in their particular
case. In turn the arbitrator should
demonstrate an awareness of the

applicable law and pertinent court
interpretations. That will also serve to
establish the arbitrator's "special competence." This approach could require
more than the two or three page opinions often specified for expedited arbitrations.
Thus, in all the steps of a case
involving statutory claims, the arbitrator should act "defensively" because of
the possibility that the award may be
challenged in court. (Whether that
occurs will depend on the loser's
assessment of its chances of securing a
more favorable result in the courts.)
Arbitrators should imagine that a federal judge is looking over their shoulder, scrutinizing every move and testing it against the Gardner-Denver criteria. That should sharpen everybody's
skill at contract and statute reading!
An analogous defensive approach
also should be followed in the "public
policy" cases. If a sexual harasser or a
drug offender in a safety-sens 1 n v e job is
involved, neither the
advocates nor the arbitrator should turn a
blind eye to the policy
implications. Judicial
review is a distinct possibility. The likelihood
that the award will be
upheld is increased if
the arbitrator forthrightly confronts the
policy issues and convincingly explains
why the result reached is compatible
with the public good.

The roles of arbitrators and courts
in interpreting and enforcing labor
agreements are very different. The
arbitrator is the parties' designated
contract reader. Absent such abnormal
circumstances as fraud, corruption or
an exceeding of arbitral authority, the
arbitrator's award should be accepted
by a reviewing court as if it were the
parties' own stipulated, definitive
interpretation of the agreement. Of
course, the award is subject to challenge for illegality or violation of public policy. But that should be the limit
of judicial review. If the parties themselves could lawfully have done what
the arbitrator has ordered, the award
ADR CURRENTS
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should be affirmed and enforced.
In construing and applying the collective bargaining agreement, arbitrators
have employed a variety of traditional
interpretive tools. I have rejected the
broadest application of the plain meaning rule, which precludes hearing evidence that would contradict the contract. I would admit at a hearing all credible evidence, within the constraints of
procedural feasibility, which shows the
actual intent of the parties. I would also
accept proofs of well-established, mutually accepted practices that indicate a
modification or amendment of the contract. In so doing I am not trying to elevate the arbitrator over the parties. My
aim is to be faithful to the parties' manifest intent in the deepest, truest sense.
The days when unions, employers
and arbitrators inhabited a self-made
world of labor relations, for the most
part untouched by public law and regulation, are gone. Back then the parties
generally had no way of challenging
the arbitrator's final and binding pronouncements, except to exclude that
arbitrator from future service. Today,
in cases involving a civil rights statute,
a federal judge can bring an arbitrator
up short with a one-line order.
Arbitrators should not flinch from
having to change some of their customary ways. Change, after all, is the law of
growth and survival, and arbitrators
ignore that truth at their peril.
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